

Testimonianza morale e ingiustizia Epistemica

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Moral Testimony and Epistemic Injustice

Abstract: Deferring to other people on moral matters, i.e., relying on their moral testimony, raises several problems. In spite of this, the paper argues that moral testimony is an important tool in our moral lives. This is particularly evident when we consider a particular kind of moral testimony, namely “testimony of oppression”. We will argue that the moral testimony of the oppressed is often affected by epistemic injustice. We will then defend the thesis that, under certain conditions, deferring to the judgments of oppressed people improves our moral beliefs about oppression and prevents us from committing epistemic injustice. In other words, it seems that there are both epistemic and moral reasons for accepting the moral testimony of the oppressed. In the context of oppression, the problems of moral testimony do not undermine its value because these problems do not outweigh the benefits we can gain by trusting the oppressed.

Keywords: Testimony, Moral testimony, Oppression, Epistemic injustice.

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